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Abstract
Colonel Blotto “secret files” are opened and Information about the way that
people play the game is revealed. The files rely on web-based experiments, which
involve a tournament version of the Colonel Blotto Game. A total of 6,500 subjects
from two diverse populations participated in the tournaments. The results are
analyzed in light of a novel procedure of multi-dimensional iterative reasoning.
According to the procedure, a player decides separately about different features of
his strategy using iterative reasoning. Measuring the response time of the subjects
assists in interpreting the reasoning procedure behind the choices. Common
properties of the successful strategies in the tournament are exposed.
Keywords: Colonel Blotto, Multi-dimensional iterative reasoning, Response
Time
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11. The Colonel Blotto Game
Imagine you are a colonel in command of an army during wartime. You and the
colonel of the enemy’s army each command 120 troops. Your troops will engage
the enemy in 6 battles on 6 separate battlefields.
It is the night before the battles and each of you must decide how to deploy your
forces across the 6 battlefields. In the morning, you will win a battle if the number of
troops you have assigned to a particular battlefield is higher than that assigned by
your opponent. In the case that you have both allocated the same number of troops
to a particular battlefield, the outcome of the battle will be a loss for both of you.
Your deployment of troops will face that of each of the other participants in the
tournament. Your total score will be the number of battles you win against all the
other participants.
How will you deploy your 120 troops?
Please pause for a second and try to devise a strategy. How would you play
such a game?
The first possibility that comes to mind is the simple strategy of allocating the
120 troops evenly across the six battlefields. This instinctive strategy is likely to be
chosen by other participants as well. If you choose this strategy, you will score no
points against these participants. If the marginal distribution of enemies’ troops in
each battlefields will be roughly symmetric around 20, the instinctive strategy will
score at most 3 points on average, while you speculate that winning the
tournament requires scoring more than 3 points.
This may lead you to consider concentrating your troops in only some of the
battlefields. But in how many? By allocating your troops evenly across five
battlefields, you will win 5 battles and score 5 points against any opponent who
chooses the instinctive strategy. However, what if the other players have the same
thought and concentrate their troops in only five fields? In that case it might be
better for you to assign a larger number of troops to only four battlefields, hoping to
score 4 points against these players. It is not obvious where to stop this chain of
arguments.
Suppose you have decided to deploy your troops in a certain number of
battlefields and to abandon the others. Should you completely abandon those
battlefields? Other players might also abandon them and therefore assigning even
a small number of troops to these fields would score some easy victories. Other
players are likely to go through a similar reasoning process and you need to decide
on the exact number of troops to be assigned to the almost abandoned battlefields.
You might also doubt that the six fields are treated symmetrically. Is it possible
that other players will systematically deploy more troops in some fields than in
others? If so, you will gain more points by assigning larger masses to specific
2fields.
As you can see, the game is quite complicated and numerous considerations
arise. At this point you are probably hoping that a game-theoretical analysis of the
situation will provide some guidance in formulating a strategy. In the multi-player
tournament a player’s target is to score more points than the others. However, you
realize that for a distribution of pure strategies to be an equilibrium, it has to be a
symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a two player game, where each
player maximizes his expected score. Sorry to disappoint you. The two player
Blotto game corresponding to the described tournament, is not a constant-sum
game (in the case of a tie on a particular battlefield neither player receives any
points) and we are not aware of a game-theoretical analysis of this version of the
Blotto game. In the classic version of the game, as suggested in Borel (1921),
players who tie on a particular battlefield split the point. This related constant-sum
version of the game has been analyzed in Hart (2008). In a game with 120 troops
allocated to 6 fields, a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium treats the fields
symmetrically and the marginal distribution of the troops in each battlefield is
essentially uniform in the interval 0,40. Do you have any basis for the conjecture
that this equilibrium of the related constant-sum game will be realized in the
tournament of our version of the Blotto game?
It seems that the best way to proceed is by understanding how real people
behave in the game. The current paper reports the results of a web-based
experimental study of the Blotto tournament. The platform used in the experiment
was the didactic website gametheory.tau.ac.il. Each subject participated only once.
The subjects belong to two separate populations:
(i) Classes: Teachers of game theory courses occasionally assign their
students virtual games and decision-theoretical problems from the site’s bank of
problems. The results obtained at the site are typically similar to those in
laboratories experiments using monetary incentives (see Rubinstein (2007)).
The Blotto game was added to the site in July 2004. Students were asked to
participate in a tournament against their classmates; we will be reporting mainly the
aggregated data of all the tournaments. The only incentive provided to the subjects
was that the three tournament winners in each class would have their names
announced by the teacher. By the spring of 2009, 4605 students had participated in
the game. They belong to 129 groups in 25 countries (Argentine, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Israel,
Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Thailand, Turkey, UK, USA and Vietnam).
(ii) Calcalist: "Calcalist" is a Hebrew business daily published in Israel. In the
eve of Passover 2009, we invited Calcalist’s readers to experience Game Theory
by playing three games posted on our website. The invitation was done through a
newsletter, a link in a major news website, a link on "Calcalist on-line" and through
3Calcalist printed version in which the games were described. 1928 readers chose
to participate. Prior to the Blotto tournament, the readers played two other games:
Arad’s Tennis Coach problem (see Arad (2009)) and a novel game called "91-100",
which will be described later in the paper. Both games naturally trigger k-level
reasoning. It was promised to the readers that the names of the three tournament
winners would appear in an article that will report the main findings.
The Students originated from a diverse range of countries. The Calcalist
readers were mostly Israelis who have in common an interest in financial news but
are quite heterogeneous in age and education. We were struck by the similarity of
the results for the two quite distinct populations. We will report the results for the
two populations side by side.
We are aware of the standard criticism of experimentation via the web without
the use of monetary incentives. We don’t want to get into the debate over the
importance of the standard protocols of experimental economics. Our experiment
was carried out on the web for two main reasons. First, the Blotto game has a huge
number of possible strategies, as well as a very large number of chosen strategies,
and thus obtaining a meaningful distribution of strategies requires thousands of
subjects. The large size of our sample, 6533 subjects, enables us to study the
variety of considerations that arise in a player’s mind, which would be difficult to
asses using a standard economics experiment’s sample. Second, the web
experiment allows us to confirm the robustness of the results by looking at both
game theory students and readers of a financial newspaper who represent a less
conventional class of subjects.
The Blotto game is endowed with a rich structure resulting from its framing and
huge set of strategies. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of strategic
behavior in such involved strategic situations. Though it is not clear that
experimental behavior reflects the way that the game would be played in real life,
the findings shed light on major considerations that arise in such a context. The
task of identifying and interpreting common patterns of behavior in the data is
challenging; The number of chosen strategies is immense and unlike some other
well-known simple games, it is hard to imagine implementing attractive procedures,
such as successive elimination of dominated strategies or k-level reasoning. Our
thesis is that the large size of the strategy space and its structure force a player to
consider the features of a strategy rather than concrete strategies. For example, a
player might believe that the vast majority of subjects will totally abandon some
battlefields. This would lead him to assign one troop to the battlefields that he
intended to abandon, so that he will score a battlefield victory over the subjects
who abandon that field completely. Such a consideration is not a standard
"best-response" calculation since it does not rely on a concrete belief on the
distribution of the other players’ strategies. We will present evidence suggesting
that some subjects utilize such multi-feature choice considerations (and some even
4do it iteratively). Overall, we find the analysis of subjects’ behavior in this game to
be a source of ideas for constructing novel models of strategic deliberations.
The main goal of the paper is to investigate traces of multi-feature thinking and
in particular multi-dimensional steps of reasoning. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to identify a process involving several non-inclusive forms of
iterative reasoning. We also open the "top secret files": We report the salient
strategies, examine whether there are returns to time and finally expose the
winning strategies. We promise a real surprise!
2. Popular strategies
A strategy is an allocation of the 120 troops across the six battlefields. The
game has around 250 million different strategies. Nevertheless, the data indicates
that there are a few strategies which are widely used. Nine of the strategies were
chosen by at least one percent of the subjects each and are presented in Table 1.




#1 23456 % M e a n S c o r e % M e a n S c o r e
1 20 20 20 20 20 20 11.4% 2.33 11.1% 2.09
2 30 30 30 30 0 0 4.4% 2.87 4.6% 2.86
3 0 0 30 30 30 30 3.4% 2.97 4.6% 2.91
4 1 2 0 00000 1 . 9 % 0 . 9 8 1 . 1 % 0 . 9 9
5 2 1 2 12 12 12 11 5 1 . 5 % 3 . 1 9 3 . 3 % 2 . 8 0
6 24 24 24 24 24 0 1.4% 3.08 1.6% 2.90
7 0 30 30 30 30 0 1.3% 2.93 1.2% 2.86
8 40 40 40 0 0 0 1.2% 2.76 1.6% 2.79
9 0 24 24 24 24 24 1.0% 3.16 1.9% 2.94
Table 1
We refer to a set consisting of all strategies obtained by permuting a particular
strategy (ignoring the labels of the battlefields) as a permutation. The game’s
strategy space splits into 400 thousand permutations. The eight most popular
permutations (those chosen by at least 2% of the participants) are the same in both
populations and were chosen by 41-45% of the participants. Table 2 presents
those permutations.
5Permutation Classes Mean Score Calcalist Mean Score
n4605 n1928
1 20-20-20-20-20-20 11.4% 2.33 11.0% 2.09
2 30-30-30-30-0-0 11.2% 2.92 13.3% 2.90
3 120-0-0-0-0-0 4.7% 0.99 2.4% 0.99
4 40–40-40-0-0-0 4.1% 2.78 4.5% 2.81
5 30-30-20-20-10-10 2.9% 2.74 2.0% 2.66
6 24-24-24-24-24-0 2.8% 3.12 4.0% 2.94
7 30-30-29-29-1-1 2.2% 3.27 2.5% 3.18
8 21-21-21-21-21-15 2.0% 3.20 4.8% 2.81
Table 2
Table 1 also presents the average score for each of the strategies. Table 2 also
presents the average score for all participants whose strategies were in the same
permutation. As can be seen from Table 1, the most popular strategies were not
very successful. The best-performing strategies in the tournament scored around
3.8 points on average while the most popular strategies scored well below that.
3. Multi-dimensional (iterative) reasoning
As mentioned in the introduction, the set of strategies in the Blotto game is
immense. It is therefore implausible that subjects hold "single point" beliefs. In
other words, it is not likely that subjects assume that most of the other participants
will choose a particular strategy. If subjects hold non-single point beliefs, then
calculating the best response is enormously difficult, even if the support of the
belief consists of only a few strategies. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
players do not adopt a process which involves finding a best response to a
well-defined belief.
We propose an alternative procedure that fits not only the Blotto game but also
other games that are characterized by a rich structure. According to this procedure,
a player has in mind some major dimensions (or features) of a strategy. What
those dimensions are depends on the structure of the game. The player makes a
decision for each dimension separately, based on his belief regarding the other
players’ choices of values in that dimension. He starts by considering the instinctive
value for this dimension. He might end the process at this point and choose that
value. Alternatively, he may respond properly to this instinctive value. That is, he
may apply what we call a proper response operator, which assigns an
6approximation of a best response to each value of the dimension. The player might
repeat this process iteratively by properly responding to the value obtained in the
previous step. Thus, if he carries out step 1 of the reasoning in this dimension, he
chooses the value that properly responds to the step 0 value, which is the
instinctive choice of value in this dimension. If he implements step 2 of the
reasoning, he chooses the value which is the proper response to the step 1 value.
Higher steps of reasoning are defined in a similar manner. After making a decision
in all dimensions, the player chooses a strategy that fits all chosen values. Note,
that this strategy is not necessarily a best response to a particular belief on the
other players’ strategies.
We were inspired to think of this scheme reading subjects’ explanations of their
choices in the Blotto tournament. Actually, we feel that such a procedure is not
alien to real life practices. Consider, for example, competition between two fashion
clothing firms, A and B, producing a similar product. Each firm need to choose the
price and the design of its product before it learns about the choice of the other
firm. In the previous year, both firms chose a price of $12 and produced a similar
design. In one of its meetings, A’s management decides to reduce the price to $10
since it expects firm B to reduce its price to $11 (A speculates that B anticipates
that A will not be altering the price). In a separate meeting, A’s management
decides to adopt a new and more modern design for the product since it expects
firm B to stick to last year’s design. Given these two decisions, the planning
department must come up with a new design that can be cheaply produced and
has a modern look. The outcome could be a provocative design made out of cheap
material. Is this a best response to firm B’s strategy? Not necessarily.
Note the similarity and difference between this procedure and the k-level
reasoning approach (see Stahl and Wilson (1995)). A k-level model assumes that
the population is partitioned into a collection of types, which differ in their depth of
reasoning. Thus, a level-0 type is non-strategic and follows a simple decision rule.
It is generally assumed that he randomizes uniformly (see Crawford and Irriberi
(2007) and Arad (2009) for different specifications of the level-0 type, which take
into account instinctive attraction to salience). A k-level type, for any k ≥ 1, best
responds to the belief that all other players are level k − 1 types. In previous studies
of other games, it was found that the most common types are level-1 and level-2
and it is rare to observe behavior consistent with a higher level.
Our procedure differs from k-level reasoning in two major aspects: First, it
relates to the features of the strategies rather than to the strategies themselves.
This enables the level of reasoning to vary across dimensions. Second, it uses a
"proper response" operator, which is only roughly connected to the best response
operator.
74. Multi-dimensional reasoning in the Blotto game
Before demonstrating how the multi-feature procedure can be plausibly applied
in the Blotto game, it is worthwhile reviewing the difficulties involved in applying the
standard k-level approach: We begin from the conjecture that the most prominent
starting point for iterative reasoning is the instinctive deployment of troops, i.e., 20
to each battlefield. We take this to be the natural specification for level-0 behavior
for two related reasons. First, it has the aesthetic features which make it the first
strategy to come to mind (evidence for which is the particularly low response time
associated with this strategy). Second, it passes the "coordination test": if two
people are playing a coordination game in which they are rewarded only if they
simultaneously choose the same allocation of 120 troops across the 6 battlefields,
they would obviously choose the instinctive strategy.
The difficulty arises when trying to specify the typical actions of higher-level
types. Unlike some other simple games, here there are many best responses to the
level-0 strategy, which makes the specification of the level-1 type unclear.
Consequently, it is not reasonable to assign a single-point belief to the level-2 type.
Holding a complex belief, which takes into account all the possible level-1
strategies, is not plausible either. Furthermore, the calculation of a best response to
a non-degenerate distribution of level-1 strategies is very difficult even if the belief
contains only a few strategies in its support.
Taking the level-0 to be a uniform randomization over the strategy space (that
is, assigning equal probabilities to all 250 million strategies) is of no benefit since
the calculation of the best response to this behavior is extremely difficult.
Thus, we find it more likely that a subject in the Blotto game employs the
multi-dimensional (iterative) reasoning process described in Section 3. In other
words, he chooses his strategy after considering several dimensions of the strategy
and applying iterative reasoning to each dimension separately.
We focus on three important features of a strategy: the number of reinforced
battlefields, the unit digit in a single-field assignment and the order of the six
single-field assignments.
(a) The number of reinforced battlefields.
Choosing to reinforce k  0,1,..,5 battlefields means that the subject has
decided to strengthen his forces in k battlefields by assigning to each of them a
large number of troops which is necessarily above the average (20).
The description of the iterative process in a particular dimension requires
specifying the starting point and the proper response operator. The starting point of
the iterative process in this dimension is the reinforcement of 0 battlefields since
the instinctive strategy, which assigns 20 troops to each battlefield, involves 0
reinforcements. This strategy is of course the only non-dominated strategy that
8involves 0 reinforcements.
As for the proper response function, we define the reinforcement of 5
battlefields to be a proper response to the reinforcement of 0 battlefields and the
reinforcement of 4 battlefields to be a proper response to the reinforcement of 5
battlefields. However, it is not clear that the reinforcement of 3 battlefields can be
considered as the third step of reasoning. It is worthwhile elaborating on this point.
The first iterative step is to reinforce 5 battlefields. (The straightforward strategy
of this kind involves deploying 24 troops in 5 of the battlefields.) If used against the
step-0 strategy it will win 5 battles and thus score the maximum number of points
possible in this game. Furthermore, if a player believes that a vast majority of
participants, but not all, will reinforce 0 battlefields, then reinforcing 5 battlefields is
a necessary condition for him to win the tournament. Given his belief, reinforcing 4
battlefields or less does not guarantee winning the tournament: if even one player
in the tournament reinforces 5 battlefields, that player will score an average of
almost 5 points, which is higher than the average score achieved by anyone who
reinforces 4 battlefields or less.
The second step is the reinforcement of 4 battlefields. (The straightforward
strategy of this kind involves deploying 30 troops in each of 4 battlefields.) The
second-step type in this dimension believes that a vast majority of players reinforce
5 battlefields. By reinforcing 4 battlefields, the player expects to score about 4
points against the step-1 strategies, while the step-1 strategies will score around 3
points against each other. Thus, he will expect to win the tournament as long as the
proportion of step-0 types is not greater than the proportion of step-1 types.
Reinforcing less than 4 battlefields yields at most an average score of 3 points and
is not successful given his beliefs.
An automatic continuation of the iterative process may lead to the thought that
reinforcing 3 battlefields is a proper response to the reinforcement of 4 battlefields.
Indeed, reinforcing 3 battlefields would generally yield a score of at least 3 points
against step-2 strategies, whereas the average score of step-2 strategies against
themselves is at most 3 (due to the possibility of ties). However, if in addition to
step-2 strategies there are strategies of lower steps, a step-2 strategy will have the
advantage of scoring about 4 points against these strategies. In such cases,
reinforcing 3 battlefields may turn out to be inferior overall. Thus, the third iterative
step is not clear-cut. In any case, the iterative chain stops here. Reinforcing less
than 3 battlefields is not optimal against strategies that involve reinforcing 3 or
more battlefields.
Note that in the calculation of a proper response a player uses "an
approximation of best response" to the lower step. He does so ignoring the other
dimensions of the strategy and believing that if he reinforces less battlefields than
his opponent, then he is likely to win in each of the reinforced battlefields. This
argument makes sense since he has more resources for each reinforced
9battlefield. However, this is just an approximation since it does not take into
account the possibility that the opponent’s assignment in each reinforced battlefield
can differ in size and some assignments may be very large.
We proceed into the analysis of the data. We will say that a subject has
reinforced a battlefield if he assigned there more than 20 troops. This definition is
somewhat arbitrary but it allows partitioning the strategies according to the number
of reinforcements and captures the essence of concentrating troops in certain
battlefields (for example the strategy 23-23-23-23-14-14 involves the reinforcement
of 4 battlefields).
The following table presents the distribution of the number of reinforced
battlefields in each population.
# fields Classes Calcalist
20 % Score RT (Stdev) % Score RT (Stdev)
0 step 0 13% 2.20 114s (3.8) 12% 2.00 81s (4.9)
5 step 1 8% 3.20 182s (9.9) 14% 2.94 133s (7.4)
4 step 2 25% 3.11 194s (5.0) 32% 3.07 143s (3.3)
3 22% 2.98 189s (6.0) 22% 2.91 128s (4.6)
2 20% 2.64 161s (4.2) 13% 2.55 125s (5.3)
1 13% 1.75 144s (7.4) 7% 1.77 106s (7.2)
Table 3
Note that in both populations, 74% of the subjects who reinforced 5 battlefields
assigned 24 troops to each, but almost half of the subjects who reinforced only 4
battlefields did not assign equal number of troops to each reinforced battlefield.
The data on response time supports our intuition regarding the structure of
iterative reasoning in this dimension. The step-0 strategy is associated with
exceptionally low response time, indicating that this choice is indeed instinctive.
The step-1 and 2 strategies are associated with a relatively high response time,
suggesting the use of a more complex deliberation process. The response time for
the step-2 strategies is somewhat higher than that for step-1 strategies. The
response time of strategies with 3 reinforced battlefields is high as well, suggesting
that subjects who made this choice were involved in a complex reasoning process
as well. It is possible that these subjects continued the iterative reasoning process
intuitively, in an attempt to respond properly to step-2 strategies (though it is not
clear that their choice is actually a proper response). Subjects who decided to
reinforce only one or two battlefields spent significantly less time on the decision, a
hint that those bad choices were made hastily.
10In Table 3 there is a difference between the Students and the Calcalist readers:
the Calcalist readers tended to reinforce 4 or 5 fields relatively more often and to
reinforce 1 or 2 fields less often. This might be because the Calcalist readers are
more sophisticated. Alternatively, having participated in the two other games (the
91-100 game and the tennis coach problem) prior to the Blotto game may have
triggered deeper iterated reasoning in this dimension among the Calcalist readers.
Note that the response time of the Calcalist readers was generally lower than
that of the Students. The difference may be explained by the fact that the Calcalist
readers were presented with an Hebrew version of the game, which is much
shorter than the English version presented to the students. Moreover, Hebrew is
the Calcalist readers’ mother tongue, whereas many of the students in the classes
are not native English. Another possible explanation is that some Calcalist readers
read the descriptions of the games in the printed version of the newspaper prior to
entering the experiment’s website. However, we have indications that a vast
majority of the participants did not see the games before they entered the
experiment website. In any case, all the relevant patterns regarding response time
will turn out to be the same for both populations.
(b) The unit digit in single-field assignments
A non-complicated and somewhat instinctive allocation of 120 troops across 6
battlefields involves single-field assignments that are multiples of 10 troops. Thus,
we consider the use of the unit digit 0 in all battlefields as reflecting step 0 in this
strategy’s feature.
The most efficient way to win a battlefield is by assigning to that battlefield one
troop more than the opponent. Thus, if a player suspects that a vast majority of the
opponents’ single-field assignments involve the use of a certain unit digit, using
often a unit digit greater by one can be considered a proper response. (Note that
the unit digits across the battlefields are not independent since they must sum up to
a multiple of ten.) Of course, the assumption in the background is that the player’s
choice of tens digit will frequently be the same as his opponents’. Thus, the first
iterative reasoning step would be the use of the unit digit 1 in some of the
battlefields. The second step would be using the unit digit 2 and so on. We doubt,
though, that the unit digit 7, for example, reflects 7 steps of reasoning. Recall that
even in the simplest games studied in the literature, level 3 is rarely found and level
4 and higher levels of reasoning are almost non-existent.
Table 4 presents the distribution of unit digits in all the single-field assignments:
11Unit digit
0 1 234 5 6789
Classes 62% 10% 4% 2% 4% 12% 1% 1% 2% 4%
Calcalist 55% 14% 5% 2% 5% 11% 1% 1% 2% 4%
Table 4
A majority of single-field assignments involved the unit digit 0 (almost all of them
were either 0, 10, 20, 30 or 40). The unit digit 1 is heavily used (primarily in the
choices 1 and 21). The step 2 choice of the unit digit 2 is less frequent (it appears
primarily in the choices of 2 and 22).
We found that 29%-38% of the subjects used the unit digits 1 or 2 in at least
one single-field assignment; about half of them used these unit digits in at least
three battlefields. These subjects spent significantly more time on deliberation than
other subjects (the median response times was 214s vs. 150s in the classes and
153s vs. 113s in the Calcalist sample).
The unit digit 5 is the second most frequent unit digit. Three possible
explanations come to mind: (i) Allocating in fives is a secondary instinctive way. (ii)
The assignment 15 is the left over after deploying 21 troops in 5 battlefields. (iii)
The number 25 can be used in order to beat the straightforward strategy that
allocates 24 troops to each of 5 battlefields.
Note that in Table 4 we find again a difference between the Students and the
Calcalist readers: the Calcalist readers used the unit digits 1 and 2 more frequently
and the unit digit 0 less frequently. This difference is in the same spirit of the
difference indicated above regarding the number of reinforced fields.
(C) Order of single-fields assignments
Once a player has chosen a particular partition of his 120 troops into 6
"divisions", he also needs to decide how to allocate the (perhaps) different-sized
divisions among the 6 battlefields. Natural procedures of allocating the troops may
treat the battlefields in a non symmetric way. For example, a player could allocate
divisions successively, starting with allocating the strongest division to battlefield 1
and ending with allocating the weakest division to battlefield 6. Alternatively, he
could concentrate the stronger divisions in the middle battlefields and the weaker in
the edges (or the opposite). Since there is more than one intuitive way to allocate
the divisions, the step 0 value in this dimension is not clear-cut.
The definition of a proper response is also not as intuitive as in the previous
dimensions. Assume, for example, that a player believes that the other player is
concentrating his troops primarily in the middle battlefields. One proper response
12would be to concentrate more troops in the middle battlefields and to assign a
relatively small number of troops to the edges. Another plausible proper response
would be to abandon the two central battlefields and assign more troops to all other
battlefields in order to increase the chances of winning those battles.
The ambiguity in specifying a natural common starting point for iterated
reasoning and in the definition of a proper response make the identification of steps
of reasoning less appealing. In the following, we present some interesting patterns
related to the order feature, while leaving aside the identification of steps of
reasoning. The six battlefields are numbered 1 to 6. Naturally, we focus on two
types of symmetry:
directional: Are battlefields 1,2,3 treated identically to battlefields 6,5,4
respectively?
positional: Is the pair of battlefields in the center (3 and 4) treated the same as
the pair of battlefields in the edges (1 and 6) and as the pair of battlefields in the
mid-positions (2 and 5)?
It should be mentioned that the Students and the Calcalist readers played
versions of the game that differed in one framing detail: Thus, in the game played
by the Students, the 6 battlefields were arranged vertically, with battlefield 1 on top
and battlefield 6 on the bottom. In the game played by the Calcalist readers, the
battlefields were arranged horizontally with battlefield 1 on the left and battlefield 6
on the right. However, this did not appear to have any effect on the results
concerning this dimension.
The following graphs present the cumulative distribution of the number of troops
assigned to each of the six battlefields. The graphs reveal that the marginal
assignment of troops to each battlefield is far from being that induced by the
uniform distribution over the interval [0,40], which is the game-theoretic prediction
for the classical constant-sum Blotto game. Note the dramatic "jumps" around
numbers like 20 and 30 and that only 10% (rather than 25%) of the choices in each
field are above 30.
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of single field assignments in the six fields
13The cumulative distributions are essentially ordered identically in the two
populations by first-order stochastic domination: 3,4,2,5,1,6. For convenience, we
also present the 33rd,5 0 th,6 7 th percentile points for each of the 6 battlefields:
Classes Calcalist
F i e l d 123456123456
33rd percentile 10 15 20 20 10 5 10 19 20 20 15 8
median 20 20 21 20 20 19 20 21 24 22 20 20
67th percentile 25 24 27 25 24 20 24 25 30 28 24 21
Table 5
Most noticeable is the low number of troops assigned to the 6th battlefield and
the high number assigned to battlefields 3 and 4. This is in line with some other
experimental results which demonstrate a tendency of people to avoid the edges
and to concentrate resources on the center positions (see, for example, Rubinstein,
Tversky and Heller (1996)).
There is almost no distinction between right and left. Battlefields 2 and 5 are
treated almost symmetrically and the distributions for battlefields 3 and 4 are also
very close. The most significant directional asymmetry is that more troops are
assigned to battlefield 1 than to battlefield 6, probably because allocations are
sometimes executed from the first battlefield to the last and battlefield 6 is treated
as the "residual".
As can be seen in Table 6, some of the most popular single-field assignments
appear in a non-symmetric way in the six fields. For example, the assignments 0
and 1 are twice as frequent in battlefields 1 and 6 as in battlefields 3 and 4 and the
frequency of the assignment of 30 to each of the battlefields 3 and 4 is much higher
than for the other pairs.
Classes Calcalist
F i e l d 123456123456
Assignment 0 18% 17% 12% 12% 17% 22% 19% 15% 9% 10% 14% 20%
A s s i g n m e n t 17 %4 %3 %3 %4 %5 %7 %5 %2 %3 %5 %6 %
Assignment 30 13% 14% 18% 17% 12% 11% 13% 14% 20% 18% 14% 11%
Table 6
145. Support for the presence of multi-dimensional iterative reasoning
At this stage, we wish to introduce the novel "91-100 game". Calcalist readers
(unlike the Students) played this game before playing the Blotto game. (For a more
detailed analysis of several variants of the 91-100 game, see Arad and Rubinstein
(2009).) The fact that the same subjects played both the 91-100 game and the
Blotto game enables us to examine the correlation between their observed
behavior in the two games. This can help in evaluating our interpretation of
subjects’ reasoning in the Blotto game. The data in this section is based solely on
the Calcalist’s subjects.
5.1 The 91-100 game
Following is a description of the game as presented (in Hebrew) to the Calcalist
readers:
You and another person are playing a game in which each player requests an
amount of money. The amount must be an integer between 91 and 100 shekels.
Each player will receive the amount he requests. A player will receive an additional
amount of 100 shekels if he asks for exactly one shekel less than the other player.
What amount of money would you ask for?
In this game it is hard to think of more than one dimension for a strategy. We
find the game in particular suitable for studying (one-dimensional) k-level thinking
for three reasons:
(i) The level-0 type specification is intuitively appealing
The choice of 100 is a natural anchor for an iterative reasoning process
because the instinctive choice when choosing a sum of money between 91 and
100 shekels (100 is the salient number in this set and "the more money the better").
The choice of 100 is in fact not entirely naive. If a player does not want to take any
risk or prefers to avoid competition, he might give up the attempt to win the
additional 100 shekels and simply request the highest certain amount.
(ii) Best-responding is easy
Given the anchor 100, best-responding to any level-k action is very simple and
leaves no room for errors.
(iii) Robustness to the level-0 specification
The type-1 action, i.e. choosing 99, is the unique best response to a wide range
of reasonable beliefs including (a) all distributions in which 100 is the most frequent
choice and (b) the uniform distribution and a class of beliefs that are close to it.
This makes the analysis robust to the specification of the level-0 behavior.
Assuming that all players wish to maximize the expected amount of shekels
they receive, the game has a unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
(which yields an expected payoff of 100).
15Action 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
Equilibrium 55% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1%
Experiment 18% 19% 10% 21% 18% 14%
Table 7
As shown in Table 7, the behavior of subjects is very far from the Nash
equilibrium. Most notable is the low percentage of subjects who chose 91 relative
to the equilibrium prediction. The choice of 100, which in equilibrium appears only
rarely, was chosen by 14% of the subjects. The actions 97-98-99 which seem to
exhibit 1-2-3 levels of reasoning were chosen by 49% of the subjects, whereas in
equilibrium they should have been chosen by only 9%. As noted above, higher
levels of iterative reasoning are almost never observed in other studies of k-level
reasoning. In our results, the actions 92-96 are also rare and appear much less
often than expected by equilibrium.
In a parallel experiment of this game, about 160 Students provided ex-post
explanations for their choices. An analysis of their explanations suggests that the
actions 92-96 are generally not an outcome of 4- to 8-level of reasoning. It also
validates the classification of 97-98-99 as the 1-2-3 levels of reasoning.
5.2 Correlation between behavior in "91-100" and "Blotto"
In this section, we seek support for our interpretation of some of the choices in
the Blotto game as an outcome of multi-dimensional steps of reasoning. This is
done by investigating the correlation between standard k-level iterative behavior in
the 91-100 game and behavior in the Blotto game which seem to exhibit iterative
reasoning in the various dimensions. More precisely, we examine the correlation
between the choices 97-98-99 in the 91-100 game and either reinforcing 4 or 5
battlefields or using the unit digits 1 or 2 in the Blotto game . Since the choices
97-98-99 clearly reflect 1-2-3 levels of reasoning in the 91-100 game, evidence of
correlation will provide support for our intuition that these Blotto game choices
emerge from iterative reasoning.
Table 8 shows the distributions of choices in the 91-100 game as a function of
the number of reinforced battlefields:
16Fields with #20 Action in 91-100
91 92-96 97-99 100
0 Step 0 26% 19% 34% 20%
5 Step 1 17% 13% 57% 13%
4 Step 2 16% 17% 55% 12%
3 16% 19% 51% 15%
2 20% 26% 41% 13%
1 14% 25% 41% 20%
Table 8
Subjects who did not reinforce any of the battlefields (i.e. 0 reinforcements)
tended to choose 91 and 100 more often and to choose 97-99 dramatically less
often than the other subjects. Of those who reinforced 4 or 5 battlefields, 55-57%
chose 97-99 ( 2%) whereas of those who reinforced 2 or less battlefields the
proportion was only 38% ( 2%). The behavior of subjects who reinforced 3
battlefields resembled more that of the subjects who reinforced 4 or 5 battlefields:
51% of them chose 97-99 ( 2%). This finding supports our conjecture that
strategies involving 3 battlefields reinforcements are the result of an intuitive
continuation of the iterative reasoning process in this dimension.
Table 9 presents the mean number of battlefields with the unit digits 1 or 2 in
the Blotto game as a function of the choices in the 91-100 game.
Action in 91-100
91 92-96 97-99 100
Blotto 18% 19% 49% 14%
Mean # of fields with digit 1 or 2 0.86 1.00 1.22 1.06
Table 9
Table 9 demonstrates that the tendency to use the unit digits 1 and 2 is
correlated with choosing 97-99 in the 91-100 game. Another way to see it: more
than 55% of the subjects who used the unit digits 1 and 2 at least once chose
97-99, while only 45% of those who did not use those digits chose 97-99.
Recall that a total of 46% of the subjects in the Blotto game reinforced 4 or 5
battlefields and 38% of the subjects used the unit digits 1 and 2 at least once. The
choices of 24% of the subjects exhibit iterated reasoning in both dimensions. We
found that these subjects’ behavior is correlated with the choices of 97-99 in the
1791-100 game. In particular, 59% ( 2%) of them chose 97-99, whereas among
those who reinforced less than 3 battlefields and did not use the digits 1 or 2, only
39% ( 2%) made those choices.
Incidentally, the choices of 97-99 are also correlated with a high score in the
Blotto game. Table 10 demonstrates this by comparing the 91-100 choices of the
highest-performing 20% in the Blotto game with the choices of the rest of the
subjects.
91 92-96 97-99 100
top 20% 10% 20% 60% 11%
the rest 20% 19% 46% 15%
Table 10
6. The Winning Strategies
A surprising result: The winning strategy in the classes’ grand tournament and
in the Calcalist tournament was the same: 2-31-31-31-23-2 (and needless to say,
was chosen by two different people....). Furthermore, there was also significant
overlap in the lists of the top 10 strategies in the two tournaments (see Table 11).
Four strategies are common to both lists and, up to a permutation, 7 out of the top
10 strategies on the Classes list appear on the other list as well.
Classes’ grand tournament Calcalist tournament
1 23456M e a n S c o r e 1 23456M e a n S c o r e
1 23 13 13 12 32 3.83 1 23 13 13 12 32 3.77
2 3 31 31 31 21 3 3.80 2 2 32 31 31 22 2 3.76
3 33 13 3 13 12 13 . 7 6 3 22 33 13 13 12 3 . 7 5
4 13 13 13 12 51 3 . 7 6 4 11 3 23 23 22 23 . 7 2
5 22 73 13 12 72 3.75 5 1 1 31 31 31 25 3.71
6 2 31 23 31 31 2 3.74 6 22 73 13 12 72 3.71
7 1 1 31 31 31 25 3.73 7 2 31 1 31 31 24 3.70
8 2 21 32 32 2 31 3.72 8 13 13 13 12 51 3.70
9 11 3 13 12 53 13 . 7 1 9 12 53 13 13 11 3 . 6 9
10 1 31 31 25 31 1 3.69 10 1 1 34 31 31 22 3.69
Table 11
18We were curious as to whether there is another strategy that was not chosen
and could have done better than the others. We simulated 41,040 strategies in
which all unit digits are 1,2 or 3 and found no such strategy.
The features of the winning strategy 2-31-31-31-23-2 are illuminated by the
explanation provided by the Calcalist winner:
"In the first stage, I decided that I would "surrender" on two fronts, but not so
easily. I thought that other people would decide to assign a few battalions to some
of the fronts and perhaps would not deploy any battalions to other fronts. So I could
win on an "abandoned" front at the inexpensive price of one battalion. Eventually, I
decided to deploy two battalions on the weak fronts in order to overpower anyone
who thought like me and placed one battalion on the weak fronts. It seems logical
to me that the weak fronts would be on the edges. I was left with 116 battalions to
allocate to four fronts, which is an average of 29 battalions per front. I decided to
reinforce three of the four remaining fronts with two battalions - that is, to deploy 31
battalions - in order to defeat those who allocated the remaining battalions equally.
In this way, I would also defeat those who allocated 30 battalions to each of the
four central fronts."
Here are some of the features characterizing the ten leading strategies:
a) Two battlefields were essentially abandoned. In fact, all 30 leading strategies
in the two tournaments used a low number of troops (1,2 or 3) in exactly two
single-field assignments.
b) The most often almost abandoned battlefields are 1 and 6. This is profitable
since these battlefields tended to be abandoned in the population much more than
the middle ones.
c) Battlefields 2 and 5 were treated rather symmetrically (and, in particular, the
strategy 2-23-31-31-31-2 does almost as well as the winning strategy).
d) 30 troops are generally assigned to the middle battlefields. This is beneficial
since the assignments to battlefields 3 and 4 tended to be the highest.
It is interesting to look at the winning strategies in the 11 tournaments of the
largest classes, which contained at least 60 subjects. In 4 of these classes
(Argentine (2) and Canada (2)), a permutation of 1-35-1-31-31-21 was the winning
strategy. In other 4 (Switzerland (2), Thailand and Slovakia), a permutation of
31-1-31-1-31-25 was the winning strategy. In the remaining 3 large classes (in
Switzerland and Argentina), the winning strategies were 31-31-31-21-3-3,
3-21-3-31-21-21 and 7-33-33-7-33-7. Note that 8 out of the 11 winning strategies
belong to the same two permutations. All winning strategies in the 11 large classes,
like the overall leading strategies (in the two grand tournaments), involved the
reinforcement of 4 battlefields and the avoidance of multiples of ten. The winning
strategies in the large classes performed well in the grand tournament as well.
While the top 10 strategies in the grand tournament scored on average 3.7-3.83,




The classic Blotto game in its continuous version was explored analytically by
Roberson (2006). The more difficult discrete case, with B troops allocated to K
battlefields, was analyzed by Hart (2008). Both concluded that in an equilibrium,
players treat the battlefields symmetrically and the marginal distribution of the
troops in each battlefield is essentially uniform in the interval 0,2B/K. We are not
aware of a game-theoretical analysis of the non-constant-sum version studied here.
The Blotto game has received widespread attention due to its interpretation
within the political economics literature as a game between two presidential
candidates who have to allocate their limited budgets to campaigns in the
“battlefield” states. Myerson (1993) suggested another interpretation of the Blotto
game as a vote-buying game.
Only a few experiments of Blotto games have been conducted. Partington
reports in his website (http://www.amsta.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6jrp/personal/blotto.html)
on a Blotto game tournament conducted in 1990. In his version, the subjects had to
allocate 100 troops across 10 battlefields. The winning strategy was
17-3-17-3-17-3-17-3-17-3.
Avrahami and Kareev (2009) report on an experiment of a "lottery version" of
the constant-sum game. Each subject played 8 times in a row against a single
player. In each round, once the two players have chosen their allocation of troops,
one battlefield per player was randomly selected and the winner of the round was
determined by comparing between the assignments in the two selected battlefields.
This design prevents framing effects induced by the ordering of the battlefields.
Among other things, the authors studied the case in which each player assigns 24
troops among 8 battlefields. In this case, the theory predicts that the marginal
distribution of the assignment in each battlefield will be uniform in 0,6. In the vast
majority of observations, 2-4 troops were assigned to each battlefield and a
significant number of subjects allocated the troops homogeneously (3 troops to
each battlefield). For another recent experiment of the game, see Chowdhury,
Kovenock and Sheremeta (2009).
Time and Performance
Does an investment of more thought in the Blotto game translate into a better
performance?
A standard regression affirms that response time contributes significantly and
positively to performance in the Blotto game. Thus, for the Students sample we
obtain the equation: score  2.07  0.12lnresponse time and for the Calcalist
20sample we obtain a similar equation: score  1.99  0.15lnresponse time.
In order to better understand the correlation, we divided the two populations into
ten deciles according to their response time. Figure 2 plots the average score and
the two standard deviations for each decile. We find that the mean score of the
three bottom deciles is dramatically lower than that of the two top deciles. On the
other hand, the average performance in the 4th-8th deciles is almost identical.








































Figure 2: Mean score by response time deciles
The best response to the uniform distribution
In most of the literature on k-level reasoning, the level-0 behavior is taken to be
a uniform distribution over the set of strategies. In the Blotto game, however, the
uniform distribution is not a plausible description of making an arbitrary choice
without the use of strategic reasoning. Nonetheless, we were curious to see what
would be the best response if all the players in the tournament had chosen their
strategies randomly according to a uniform distribution. For this purpose, we ran a
simulation of the Blotto tournament with 9990 strategies drawn from the uniform
distribution together with the five leading strategies and the five most popular
strategies in the Calcalist tournament.
The winning strategy in this simulation, with a score of 3.54,w a st h e
homogeneous strategy, which assigns 20 troops to each field. Ex-post we
understand that this is indeed the best strategy against this distribution. This is
because when strategies are chosen from the uniform distribution, the marginal
cumulative distribution of troops for each field is concave. None of the winning
strategies in the experiment performs well in the simulated tournament. The
winning strategy in the two experiments scored only about 3.10 in the simulation;
more than 30% of the strategies performed better than this strategy. Nevertheless,
21it is difficult to think of the homogeneous strategy as a best response to the uniform
distribution.
Attentiveness of subjects
Subjects were not forced to assign all the 120 troops across the battlefields.
This was a device for checking their attentiveness. Among the students, only 5.4%
of the subjects chose such a dominated strategy. Among Calcalist’s readers, the
proportion dropped to 3.0%.
Note also that only 12% of our subjects chose the instinctive homogenous
strategy. To scale this fact, in the Avrahami and Kareev (2009) experiment – which
was carried out in a laboratory with monetary incentives – 25% of the subjects
chose the homogenous strategy in the first round of the game.
Gender effects
Calcalist readers (but not the students) were asked to report their gender. Only
10% of the readers were females. Males did significantly better with an average
score of 2.75 ( 0.01) as compared to 2.55 ( 0.04) for females. This is in spite
of the fact that females spent more time on the game (females’ median response
time was 145 vs. 125 for the males).
Experience in Game Theory
We asked the Calcalist readers whether they had ever taken a course in Game
Theory and one-sixth of them had. One might expect that a course in game theory
would improve one’s ability to play games; especially a synthetic game like the one
experimented here. We found that taking a Game Theory course has only a
marginal effect: The average score of Game Theory graduates was 2.78 ( 0.03)
as compared to a close average score of 2.72 (  0.01) for the others. In other
words, a course in Game Theory may be entertaining, but there is no evidence that
it helps in playing games.
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